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This paper investigates whether the Pesticides Iniative Program has sig-
nicantly aected the export performance of Senegal's horticulture industry.
We apply two main microeconometric techniques, dierence-in-dierences
and matching dierence-in-dierences, to identify the eect of the Pesti-
cides Initiative Program on exports of fresh fruits and vegetables. We use a
unique rm-level dataset containing data on sales, employment, and exports
by product and destination markets, as well as rm enrolment year, over
2000-2008. The results suggest that while the program had no signicant
eect on exports pooled over all products and destinations, it had a positive
eect when considering fresh fruits and vegetables exports to the European
Union.
21 Introduction
A poll featured in the Financial Times of July 12, 2010 highlighted two striking
facts. First, between 60 and 80 percent of the respondents in Western countries
felt that budget cuts would help rather than hurt the economy; second, aid to
developing countries was ranked rst as a candidate for cuts in the U.S. and U.K.,
and second in all other countries. Against this background, in the words of a recent
OECD document, \[t]here is a growing political demand among academics, NGOs,
international agencies and voters for results in development." (OECD 2010a).
The demand for evaluation applies to aid for trade (AFT) as well as to other
forms of aid.1 After declining as a share of Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) in the second half of the 1990s, AFT commitments have increased by 62%
since the launch of the AFT initiative at the 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong,
reaching $41.7 billion or 37% of \sector-allocable" ODA in 2008. For the EU, trade-
related assistance (TRA) is an important part of the trade-and-development policy
nexus, responding to a widely-perceived need to provide adjustment assistance to
Southern partners aected by increasingly stringent product standards and by
recent changes in the EU's system of preferences (see te Velde et al. 2006).
What do we know about the impact of aid for trade (AFT)? The literature
is limited. As for its allocation, Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) found that,
after controlling for absorption capacity (governance etc.), it correlated with an
indicator of `demand' based on indices of under-trading. As for its impact, Wagner
(2003) explored whether aid generated trade in the form of exports from the donor
country to the recipient (up to the early 1990s, over half of all bilateral aid was
at least partially tied to donor exports); he found, using a gravity equation, that
this particular form of trade was indeed boosted. By contrast, Osei, Morrissey and
Lloyd (2004) ran a gravity equation in rst dierences on a panel of four European
donors and 26 African recipients after testing for the direction of causalitybetween
bilateral aid and trade 
ows. They found an unstable and, on the whole, insignif-
icant impact of aid on trade (also in the form of exportsfrom donor to recipient).
Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2008) used a moreconventional gravity equation includ-
ing bilateral aid 
ows as a regressor (instrumented by their one-year lagged value)
and found a signicant although small elasticity, again, for 
ows from donor to
recipient.
1Aid for Trade was dened by the 2006 WTO AFT Task Force through six categories: (i)
Trade policy & regulations; (ii) Trade development; (iii) Trade-related infrastructure; (iv) Build-
ing productive capacity; (v) Trade-related adjustment; (vi) Other trade-related needs. The rst
three are referred to as Trade-related assistance (TRA); the last three are referred to as the
`wider aid-for-trade agenda' (EC 2008).
3Only some of the most recent studies have looked at whether aid raised the
export capacity of recipient countries. Cali and te Velde (2009) regressed trade
costs and the value of exports on control variables and lagged AFT disburse-
ments, using data from the OECD's Credit Reporting System. Their sample was
a panel of countries covering 1995-2007, and they dealt with endogeneity and
measurement errors in AFT 
ows by instrumenting them with the World Bank's
index of civil liberties. The message that seems to emerge across their various
specications is that aid to trade facilitation and infrastructure seems (by and
large) to have a signicant eect (the former on trade costs, the latter on ex-
port values), while aid to productive capacity is insignicant. When looking at
sectorally-targeted aid, controlling for country  sector xed eects (comparative
advantage) they found, again, that aid to infrastructure had a signicant impact
but aid to productive capacity didn't. Brenton and von Uexkull (2009) combined
mirrored product-level (HS4) export data with export-development (ED) aid data
from the GTZ (covering 1975-2005) and from the OECD/WTO Trade Capacity
Building Database (covering 2001-2005) for 48 countries. They useda dierence-
in-dierences (DID)2 approach where the performance variable was exports and
regressors included lagged exports, country and year  product xed eects, and
contemporaneous and lagged aid coded in binary form (ED program in force =
1). By and large, once outliers were dropped, matching yielded insignicant coef-
cients in spite of the relatively large sample size, suggesting that once selection
eects were taken into account, export-development programs provided little sig-
nicant boost to exports. All in all, it is fair to say that, as the literature stands,
the eect of AFT on the export performance of beneciary countries has not been
clearly established on the basis of aggregate numbers.
Among TRA programs, technical-assistance ones have scarcely been evalu-
ated.3 A brochure published by the EU Commission (EC 2006) tells the interesting
story of a Kenyan fruit and vegetables exporter who got assistance from the EU's
Pesticides Initiative program (PIP); the case study presents the program as
\[...] to provide support to companies like Myner [the Kenyan ex-
porter], to help them get up to speed with European food safety and
traceability requirements. [...] Since it began in July 2001, the PIP
has had a positive eect on more than 26'000 ACP producers, many
of whom are small-scale farmers. Nearly 6.25 million Euros has been
2See section 3 below for a discussion of the DID and matching approaches.
3Marcano and Ruprah (2009) is one of the few papers looking specically at technical-
assistance programs. Using a multiple-treatment approach, they found a positive impact to
Chile's Neighborhood Improvement Program and Guatemala's Social Investment Fund (both
water-access program) over and above public-works spending.
4committed to the program, with each applicant allocated around 86'000
Euros. In line with the principles of the ACP-EU partnership agree-
ment singed in Cotonou in 2000, the PIP aims to contribute to the
development of the ACP's private sector and to promote regional inte-
gration."
As for the case study itself, the brochure explains that
\[w]hen Myner Exports began working with the Pesticides Initiative
Program, or PIP in 2002, it was exporting about 300 tonnes of French
beans, snow peas, passion fruit, and sugar snaps a year to the European
Union. Today, the company exports some 900 tonnes a year. "
Quoting this particular case study in their assessment of the EU's TRA, te
Velde et al. (2006) noted that \in an ideal world, one would compare this supported
company with a similar one that was not supported" (p. 21). This is precisely
what we set up to do in the present paper, although using Senegal instead of Kenya
as our sample of study.
We chose Senegal because the data we had access to provided a unique combi-
nation. Through a World Bank project run by Denisse Pierola and Paul Brenton
at the World Bank, we obtained raw les from Senegal's customs with export data
at the transaction level for every year between 2000 and 2008. The data include
the exporter's ID, the product code, the country of destination, and the export
value for over 500 HS8 fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) products. We were able to
merge the customs' dataset with industrial-survey data and a list of PIP benecia-
ries provided by the EU Commission.4 This unique combination made it possible
to construct a treatment group of rms that got assistance and a control group of
rms that did not, and this for a sample period that ran from before the program
to its end.5
Using this rich data set, we used a wide array of approaches to estimate the
eect of the PIP on rm-level exports of treated products (FFV). We ran DID
regressions of the value of exports, by product  rm  destination, on control
variables as well as a dummy variable marking `treatment' by the PIP. In order to
deal with selection issues, we combined the DID approach with propensity-score
matching, although the small size of the sample and the systematic dierences in
size between treatment- and control-group rms considerably reduced the power of
4Thanks to Morag Webb for providing us with the data.
5Although we had similar customs data from a number of other countries, none covered years
before the start of the PIP. After merging, rm IDs have been deleted from the dataset for
condentiality reasons.
5matching. We also used a control-function approach similar to Heckman's selection
model (Heckman 1979).
In most specications we tried, we failed to nd a signicant impact. Only when
considering the rm aggregate exports of FFV to the EU, did we nd a positive
and signicant eect of the program. Given the small size and peculiarities of the
sample, our results should be treated very cautiously and we would certainly stop
short of concluding that the PIP was useless on the basis of this single impact-
evaluation exercise. Additionally, beneciary rms self-selecting in the program
would introduce a bias in the estimated treatment eect. However the direction of
the bias is not clear. If self-selected rms are larger and potentially more ecient
than others the estimated treatment eect should be biased upwards. Inversely
less productive rms may be more likely to rely on nancial aid or rent-seeking,
biasing the eect downwards. If so, clearly more research is needed on this issue,
possibly on other, larger samples to assess whether the PIP had any impact or
not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on the
exporting environment of Senegalese FFV producers and on how the PIP addresses
its objective of alleviating some of the constraints that these producers face. Sec-
tion 3 presents the impact evaluation: data, estimation issues. Section 4 presents
the baseline results and some robustness tests. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Senegal's Exports of Fresh Fruits & Vegetables
According to Senegal's National Horticultural Direction, national exports of fresh
fruits and vegetables (FFV) have been rising at a rate of about 15% a year since
2001. French beans alone { the main export crop { account for most of this
increase, with volumes up from 652 tons to almost 9'000 between 2001 and 2007
(Figure 1).
6Figure 1: Horticulture Exports (in tons) from Senegal, 1997-2007.
Geographical and climatic conditions in the Niayes, Senegal River Valley, Casamance
and Dakar regions make it possible to export out-of-season vegetables and trop-
ical fruits crops in response to a rising demand foryear-round availability in the
European market.6 Apart from minor volumes shipped to neighboring countries,
the European Union (EU) remains the main destination market. In 2007, France
accounted for 40% of Senegal's FFV export volumes, followed by the Netherlands
(35%) and Belgium (16%). Exports are mostly fresh produce and include French
beans (42% of the exported volume), cherry tomatoes (23%), mangoes (16%) and
minor crops including melons, peppers and hibiscus. In 2008, Senegal ranked
fourth among African suppliers of French beans to the EU, after Morocco, Egypt
and Kenya.
Exporting companies are organized in two federations, ONAPES and SEPAS.7
Most belong to SEPAS, the oldest of the two, which coordinates transport, provides
market information and assists members in dealing with overseas buyers. ONAPES
was created by the seven largest exporters in 2000 to coordinate compliance with
traceability standards and to seek GlobalGAP certication.
To penetrate the EU fruit and vegetable market, Senegal's exporters must com-
ply with strict and rising standards. The EU's legislation imposes (1) common
6EU imports of fresh fruit and vegetables have experienced a cumulative growth of 39%
between 2002 and 2008, with an average 7% increase in value and 6% in volume per year.
7Organisation Nationale des Producteur- Exportateurs Senegalais. S en egalaise d'Exportation
de Produits Agricoles et de Services.
7marketing standards for FFV; (2) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures; (3)
general hygiene rules based on HACCP control mechanisms; and (4) traceabil-
ity standards. The EU's SPS measures have become notably more stringent in
the 1990s. Particularly relevant to FFV are reduced tolerance levels for chemical
residues.8 First, about 350 active substances initially approved for use in the EU
have been gradually withdrawn (out of the 823 initially allowed). Second, Maxi-
mum Residue Levels (MRL)9 and Import Tolerances (IT)10 are imposed at levels
specic to particular protection chemical-crop combinations. When an IT has not
been established, a default value of 0.01 mg/kg corresponding to Level of Detec-
tion (LOD) in inspection labs are used. The registration of an IT is a complicated
process involving the submission of a complete residue dossier including eld trials
and lab analysis results. For exporters of minor crops { most tropical crops except
bananas{ from developing countries, the challenge is compounded by the fact that
agrochemical companies have little incentive to provide registration residue data
for those crops because the benet would not cover the cost.
HACCP and tracability requirements came into force with the General Food
Law of 2002 (EC R 178/2002). Traceability means that EU food companies must
document from (to) whom they are buying (selling) so that products can be traced
back to their origin if they prove defective or dangerous. Although traceability is
legally limited to a `one step forward, one step back' principle within the EU (with
no obligation to keep records in third countries), in practice EU buyers tend to go
beyond the strict legal requirement. Complete traceability throughout the chain
all the way up to the overseas producers is part of many private standards like the
GlobalGAP. Legislative changes in EU standards and their potential detrimental
eects on small growers/exporters were one of the primary drivers behind the
establishment of the COLEACP's Pesticides Initiative Program (PIP).11
Maertens and Swinnen (2009) show that the E.U.'s rising standards have pro-
foundly altered the structure of the supply chain in Senegal's horticulture sector.
8In the late 1990s, an updated harmonised legislation package on pesticide Maximum Residue
Limits (MRL) { EC Directive 91/414 and subsequent Regulation 396/2005{ created concern for
ACP horticultural exporters because of its stringency.
9The MRL is the level of residue legally permitted to remain in/on a food or animal feedstu
following the use of a Crop-Protection-Chemical (CPC) under Good Agriculture Practice (GAP),
i.e. under the specic label instructions of the approved product.
10An import tolerance is an MRL set for imported products containing active plant-protection
substances not authorised in the EU for reasons other than public health, or when a dierent
level is appropriate because the existing Community MRL was set for reasons other than public
health.
11The purpose of the Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacic Liaison Committee (COLEACP) is to
facilitate the 
ow of trade in fresh fruit and vegetables between Africa-Caribbean-Pacic (ACP)
countries and the EU.
8First, the nancial constraints generated by the need to comply with increas-
ingly stringent standards have induced consolidation at the intermediation stage,
with only the larger rms able to cope. Second, the relationship between inter-
mediaries and producers has changed, with more control by intermediaries over
farming methods. Tighter control has been obtained through increasingly precise
contracts, technical assistance, and the provision of credit and farm inputs. Third,
the induced changes have also aected the structure of upstream farm produc-
tion, with a sharp decrease in the incidence of contract farming and a rise in that
of large-scale estate production. Interestingly, Maertens and Swinnen's analysis
suggests that these changes have been accompanied by a rise in the incomes of
aected households.
2.2 The PIP in Senegal
The Pesticide Initiative Program (PIP) is nanced by the European Development
Fund (EDF) and implemented by the COLEACP. With an overall budget of 34.1
million euros, the PIP's rst phase started in 2001, initially for a ve-year period; it
was extended by two additional years. The program has two main objectives. The
rst is to enable ACP exporters of FFV to comply with European traceability and
food-safety requirements (in particular as regards pesticide residues). The second
is to consolidate the position of small-scale producers in the ACP horticultural
value chain. The PIP's support activities are organised around ve components:
(i) good company practises, (ii) training, (iii) capacity building, (iv) regulation &
standards, and (v) information & communication. The core of the support (almost
30% of program budget) goes to component (i), which consists of helping produc-
ers and exporters to set up internal food-safety management systems in production
and marketing operations. The regulation & standards component ensures that all
substances recommended in crop protocols (`technical itineraries') are authorised
in both the EU and origin country. Additionally, when needed, the program in-
troduces registration of active substances as well as import-tolerance applications.
This is especially important for minor crops of interest to smallholders. Finally,
the capacity-building component aims at developing national capacity to provide
the services needed by the industry. Beneciaries of capacity-building activities
include private consultants (training courses on food safety, pesticide use, and
IPM); accredited laboratories (pesticide residue analysis); public services (includ-
ing extension services and pesticide registration bodies); and strong professional
organizations.
New traceability requirements and recent changes in the EU's pesticides regu-
lation have been of particular concern to Senegal's horticultural industry|mainly
the green bean industry. Senegal ranks fourth, after Kenya, Ghana and Uganda,
9for the number of PIP protocols signed. PIP beneciaries produce and export
essentially green beans, cherry tomatoes and mangoes to the European market.
Their needs relate essentially to traceability systems, sta training, access to in-
formation, advice on pesticide MRLs, and infrastructure improvement. Over the
project's life, several missions went to Senegal and met with beneciary companies
to review and adjust the activities carried out as part of the program. PIP support
activities in Senegal have consisted of in-company training on hygiene and food-
safety procedures, development of traceability systems, safe use of pesticides, and
recognition of mango pests for mango exporters. Four companies also requested
support to obtain GlobalGAP certication; for those, pre-audits were conducted
to help identify and correct problem areas. SEPAM obtained its certication in
2004; Soleil Vert, Baniang and AgriConcept obtained theirs in 2007. Remaining
exporters, mainly smaller ones, are neither certied nor undertaking particular
investments to get it. Except for SEPAM, SAFINA and GDS, Senegal's FFV
exporters have outgrower contracts with smallholders (involving training and sup-
port) rather than own production sites. In 2006, in cooperation with Senegal's AN-
CAR (Agence Nationale de Conseil Agricole et Rural) the PIP launched `Golden
Bean', an awareness campaign directly targeting 1'000 small FFV producers.
Finally, under the regulations component, eld trials have been conducted on
PIP priority crops including green beans, cherry tomatoes, okra, avocado, passion
fruit, mango, papaya and pineapple.12 Trials were initiated in November 2003
on green beans and cherry tomatoes, and in early 2004 on the remaining crops,
with crop samples collected and shipped to European GLP-certied laboratories
for residual analysis. A particular technical itinerary was developped for mangoes
with the objective of bringing mango production in line with European regulations.
2.3 Selection into the Program
Eligibility starts with the completion and submission of a request for PIP interven-
tion addressing the applicant's particular needs and objectives. The request iden-
ties by self-assessment the problem to be resolved |e.g. MRL, non-accredited
plant-protection products, or traceability| and puts forward possible xes such
as training in ICM/IPM systems or safe use of pesticides, implementation of food-
safety and traceability systems, or `technical itineraries'. It also species antici-
pated results, like getting into conformity or maintaining current export volumes.
Finally, the request assesses a time line and budget, specifying what is requested
12Field trials are an important part of the establishment or amendment of crop protocols,
enabling experts to analyze pesticide residual levels in fruit and vegetables. Following eld
trials, crop protocols are revised as required to achieve compliance with EU MRLs, and the
information gathered in the process feeds back into farming practices.
10from the PIP and what is provided by the applicant. Applications are considered
on a rst-come rst-served basis, with no prioritization or selection criteria. To be
accepted, a requested intervention must help to achieve product compliance with
EU traceability and food-safety (pesticide residues) regulations. Upon acceptance,
a protocol stating the actions to be implemented by each party on a cost-sharing
basis (50% for each, except for smallholders who are expected to contribute only
20%) is signed. Wages and investment costs are de facto excluded. The actions
listed in the protocol are chosen among a menu oered by the PIP under its ve
components; however, the combination in each protocol is specic to a rm and
varies across beneciaries. So far, most of the nancing has gone to training costs,
technical support and the development of a food-safety toolbox containing crop
protocols, GAP guidelines, and Hortitrace, a traceability software developed by
the PIP. The program's rst phase has covered 21 countries13 and 320 export
companies. Out of those, 219 rms beneted from the `good company practices'
component (advice and assistance for setting up sanitary quality and traceabil-
ity systems, and certication pre-audits). 153 beneted from training under the
capacity-building component.
2.4 The PIP's Evaluation
An evaluation of the PIP's rst phase was undertaken in June 2008. The ap-
pendix's valuation matrix summarizes the report's ndings and details objectives,
expected results, performance indicators, and outcomes. Performance indicators
are both quantitative and qualitative. The evaluation relies on trade data reported
by the rms themselves and from Eurostat. Additionally, a survey was conducted
among PIP beneciaries and EU importers. As highligthed in the appendix's eval-
uation matrix, program impacts are evaluated at the aggregate level. Outcomes
for beneciary rms are generally reported without controlling for location, size
or experience in exporting FFV to the EU market, with the exception of spe-
cic objective (S1), for which outcomes are reported by ACP country or type of
intervention (O1, O2, O3).
Overall, the evaluation report drew up a very positive image of the program's
impact, contributing to the launch of a second ve-year phase in 2009. While fairly
comprehensive, the PIP's evaluation suers from a typical drawback of this type
of exercise|namely, the lack of a counterfactual to benchmark the performance
of treated rms and products.
13The countries covered are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Mauritius, Jamaica, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, the Dominican Re-
public, Senegal, Surinam, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
113 Impact Evaluation
3.1 The Data
Our dataset is constructed using three primary databases which together form a
rich and unique combination. First, we have export data at the transaction level
(aggregated to the rm level) from raw customs les over 2000{2008. Each record
includes the rm's tax ID, the product code, the country of destination, and the
export value (in US dollars) and quantity (in tons) for over 500 HS8 products to 90
countries. Exports 
ows are reported annually. Second, the PIP's administration
in Brussels provided us with a list of the Senegalese rms that got assistance from
the program in each year of the sample period.14 Finally, we obtained data on
employment and sales from the CNI, Senegal's National Statistics Direction.15 As
the CNI also identies rms by their tax ID, we could merge the three datasets.
Among the reporting rms, almost 3% appear only once in the dataset. That is,
they export only one product to one destination one year. As these observations
are likely to be mis-reports or individuals, we drop them from our sample. We also
drop international organizations and embassies, as well as trading and transport
companies (the latter group represents about a quarter of all observations). This
leaves us with a sample of almost 2'000 observations.
Let i an exporting rm, k be a product, j a destination country, and t a year.
As the PIP targets products (FFV), some of a rm's products may be covered
and some others not. In addition, technical assitance provided under the PIP
helps make FFV marketable on EU markets, but does not necessarily help on
other markets with dierent (or no) food-safety requirements. In view of this,
we take the (i;k;j;t) vector as our Primary Sample Unit (PSU). Our dependent
variable is the annual 
ow of exports of product k to destination j by rm i in
year t, yikjt. That is, we take the intensive margin as our baseline measure of
performance. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of rm-level covariates and per-
formance indicators for treated and non-treated 
ows. Covariates include rm i's
annual (overall) turnover, salesit, and employment, Nemployeeit, the number of
products it exports. We also include Nprodit, the number of products it exports
to destination j Nprodijt, the number of destinations to which it exports product
k, Ndestikt and a binary variable equal to one if rm i has more than one year
of experience in exporting product k to destination j, expikj are included. Perfor-
mance indicators at the intensive margin include rm i's exports of product k to
14Variation in the intensity of the treatment across rms would induce a bias in the estimation
of the eect. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the intensity of the treatment.
15The data is collected by the Centre National d'Identication (CNI), part of the National
Statistics Direction.
12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, non-Treated and Treated Flows.
Non-Treated Flows Treated Flows
Mean Mean t-Stat p t
Sample 1370 492
Firm characteristics
salesit 21.7 21.1 4.9 ***
Nemployeeit 4.4 5.3 -6.9 ***
Export performace: intensive margin
exportikjt 8 10.1 -17.6 ***
total exportFFV
ijt 8.2 11.9 -22.8 ***
total exportikt 8.5 11.1 -20.9 ***
total exportFFV
it 8.6 13.21 -34.9 ***
total exportit 12.4 13.1 -7.7 ***
Export performace: extensive margin
Ndestikt 1.5 2.2 -11.5 ***
NdestFFV
it 1.3 8 -19.5 ***
Ndestit 5.08 3.4 12.3 ***
Nprodijt 14.9 3.2 20 ***
NprodFFV
ijt 0.6 2.7 -20.1 ***
NprodFFV
it 1.3 8 -19.5 ***
Nprodit 38.9 9.3 231 ***
Variables are in logs. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance of the t-statistics at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
destination j in year t, exportijkt; its total exports of FFV to country j in year t,
total exportFFV
ijt ; its total exports of product k worldwide, total exportikt; its total
exports of FFV worldwide, total exportsitFFV ; and its total exports worldwide,
total exportit. Export performance indicators at the extensive margin include rm
i's number of destinations with product k in year t, Ndestikt; its number of desti-
nations with FFV, NdestFFV
it ; its total number of destinations, Ndestit; its number
of products to destination j, Nprodijt; its number of FFV products to destination
j, NprodFFV
ict ; its number of FFV products wordwide, NprodFFV
it , and its total
number of products wordwide, Nprodit.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for participating and non-participating
rms. Two observations are in point. First, participating rms are larger than
non-participating. Thus, size must be controlled for in order for non-participating
rms to provide a credible counterfactual. Second, these are all small rms, as
13Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, non-Treated and Treated Firms.
Non-treated rms Treated rms
Mean Mean t-Stat p t
Sample 131 100
Firm characteristics
salesit 19.5 20.3 -2.0 **
Nemployeeit 2.9 4.7 -4.7 ***
Export performace: intensive margin
total exporteu
it 10.1 11.9 -6.7 ***
total export
ffv
it 10.0 12.0 -6.8 ***
total exportit 10.7 11.9 -4.7 ***
Export performace: extensive margin
Ndest
ffv
it 1.6 4.2 -5.9 ***
Ndestit 2.4 2.5 -0.3
Nprod
ffv
it 1.6 4.2 -5.9 ***
Nprodit 5.1 4.8 0.4
Variables are detailed in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance of the t statistics
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
average numbers of products and destinations are very small.
3.2 Estimation Issues
Estimating the eect of the PIP poses a standard missing-data problem|estimating
how much smaller would have been the export 
ows that got assistance, had they
not gotten assistance.16 Formally, let
dikjt =






1 if 9 : t such that dikjt = 1
0 otherwise:
That is, dikj marks the treatment group. The basic estimator for the problem at
hand is the dierence-in-dierences (DID):
16Exports to non-EU destinations may be reduced because of a reallocation eect. If this is
the case, the eect of the treatment on the treated would be further increased.
14yikjt = xikjt + 
dikjt + ikj + t + uikjt (1)
where ikj and t are respectively rm  destination  product and time xed
eects, and uikjt is an error term. Fixed eects ikj control for time-invariant
rm characteristics potentially aecting both performance and selection into the
program, like managerial ability (see Angrist and Krueger 1999, Smith 2000, or
Jaee 2002).
Next, we combine the DID estimator (1) with matching, following Heckman,
Ichimura and Todd (1997). From now on, for simplicity of exposition, let us denote
by a `
ow' a (rm  product  destination) triplet. Using results by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983), matching is done on the basis of the estimated propensity score
(PS), using a probit or logit regression of the participation status on a vector z of
observable rm characteristics. Letting vikjt be an error term orthogonal to uikjt,
the rst-stage selection equation can be written as
Pr(dikj = 1) = f(zikj0 + vikj): (2)
In (2), the vector z, which contains x and may be identical to it if no outside
determinant of participation is available, must be evaluated at the time the par-
ticipation decision is made{typically its initial value. The estimated propensity
score is then retrieved from (2), and the control group is constructed by select-
ing untreated rms whose propensity scores are \close enough" to those of treated
ones. How close is close is the analyst's choice. Under nearest-neighbour matching,
each treated 
ow is matched with the untreated 
ow having the closest PS, or with
a combination of the n closest untreated 
ows. Under kernel matching, 
ow g is
matched with a weighted average of untreated 
ows within a chosen radius, using
either uniform weights or weights that decrease with distance in the PS space.17
Practically, DID-with-matching estimation is done in two steps: In the rst, the
participation equation is estimated, yielding an estimated PS and a common sup-
port; in the second, the DID equation is estimated on the common support. The
latter is formed by disregarding unmatched individuals as well as those with esti-
mated PS of zero or one. Note that, if the rst-stage regression predicts treatment-
group status too well, it will reduce the common support and thus the sample on
which the DID regression is run; if it predicts it too badly, the matching will be
poor and the conditional-independence assumption will be unlikely to hold. The
choice of RHS variables to include in z is thus a matter of judgement. The quality
of the matching can be assessed by so-called `balancing tests'. One, proposed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), compares the mean value of each covariate between
17On this, see Leuven and Sianesi (2003) or Smith and Todd (2005).
15the treatment and control group. When the dierence is too large, the null hy-
pothesis (that the samples are balanced with respect to the covariates when they
are balanced with respect to the propensity score) is rejected.
We also control for selection using a control-function approach that closely
resembles the Heckit procedure (Heckman 1979). The approach proceeds, again,
in two steps. The rst-step regression is as before, i.e. (2). In the second step,
inverse Mills ratios retrieved from the rst step are added to (1) as additional
regressors.
Before we turn to the results, note that, besides selection bias, other issues
may complicate the estimation of 
 in (1). One is serial correlation. Persistence
in the process driving the error term may be aggravated by the extreme form
of serial correlation in the treatment variable. Bertrand, Du
o and Mulainathan
(2004) show that ignoring this source of serial correlation can lead to an in
ated
probability of type-I errors (wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis of no eect, i.e.
being over-optimistic in the evaluation of the treatment's impact). This calls for
a correction that they suggest. The correction consists of a two-step procedure in
which, in Step 1, individual performance for both treated and untreated individuals
is regressed on all observables except the treatment. In Step two, residuals from
Step 1 for the treated individuals only are retrieved and averaged for (i) the pre-
treatment period, (ii) the treatment period. The procedure requires a common
treatment period, since otherwise the pre- and post-treatment periods would be
undened for the control group. Those average residuals form a two-period panel.
They are then regressed on
dikj =

1 if  = 1 and (i;j;k) 2 T
0 otherwise,
where  = 1 denotes the treatment period. The estimated ATT is the coecient
on dikj in the second step.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Results
Balancing properties are addressed by testing for equality of means between treated
and matched controls for nearest-neighbour matching. Table 4.1 reports results
from balancing tests. The table reports, for each covariate included in the probit
model determining selection into treatment, the percentage bias after matching,
the reduction in the bias, and the t-test statistics for the dierence in means
between treated and control groups after matching. Variables included in the
16propensity score specication are the natural logarithm of rm i's initial turnover,
ln(salesit0, the natural logarithm of its initial number of employees, ln(NEmployeesit0),
the initial number of products exported by rm i to destination j, Nprodij0, the
initial number of countries served with product k, Ndestikt, the initial natural
logarithm of total export value of FFV products from rm i to destination j.
Table 3: Balancing Properties of Covariates in Treated and Control Groups
Sample Mean Mean % % t-test
treated control bias between reduction Mean(treated)
"
ows" "
ows" treated bias =Mean(control)
and controls t p > t
ln(salesit0) Unmatched 21.39 21.25 11.5 1.3 0.19
Matched 21.39 21.56 -13.6 -18.6 -1.72 0.08
ln(Nemployeesit0) Unmatched 5.02 4.18 55.2 7.05 0.00
Matched 5.02 4.94 4.7 91.6 0.44 0.66
Nprodij0 Unmatched 2.38 32.03 -144.2 -14.77 0.00
Matched 2.38 2.37 0.1 100 0.16 0.87
Ndestikt Unmatched 2.41 1.37 114.5 15.1 0.00
Matched 2.41 2.3 9.7 91.6 0.84 0.40
ln(total exportFFV
ijt0 ) Unmatched 11.93 7.51 154 16.63 0.00
Matched 11.93 12.13 -7 95.4 -1.21 0.23
Matching is by nearest neighbour. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance of the t statistics
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Results show that, for many covariates, there is a strong bias before matching
but matching eliminates it. The null hypothesis of balanced sub-samples is not
rejected except for turnover.
Table 4 reports dierence-in-dierence (DID) estimates on the treated, for our
baseline specication. That is, the average eect of the PIP on assisted rms
where the export performance indicator is the export value in US dollars, of prod-
uct k, from rm i, to destination country j, in year t: Column (1-3) reports DID
estimates without matching, and with or without covariates. Column (4) reports
17DID estimates with matching, i.e. restricting the sample to the common sup-
port dened in the NN-PSM procedure. Matching is done at the rm, product
destination level. Column (5) reports treatment-eect estimates using Heckman's
two-step procedure, i.e. estimates from the second-step regression run with the
inverse Mills ratio. Finally, column (6) reports results from the second stage of
the procedure suggested by Bertrand, Du
o and Mulainathan (BDM) (2004).
Results for the rst step of the Heckman and BDM procedures are reported
in Appendix 9 and 10. All regressions are run at the i;k;j;t level and standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Here the variable of interest is the treatment
indicator variable treatmentikjt taking value one if rm i exporting product k to
destination country j in year t, beneted from the PIP program.
Coecients in all specications are not signicant, suggesting no eect of the
program on rms export performance. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of the export value of product k from rm i to country j in time t. All
regressions control for (rm times product times country) and time xed eects.
Our main variable of interest is treatmentikjt, a dummy variable taking value 1 if
rm i exporting product k to country j beneted from the PIP in year t. Columns
1-3 show dierence-in-dierence estimations, where the control variables include
the natural logarithm of annual turnover of rm i in year t ln(salesit, the natural
logarithm of the number of employees for rm i in year t, ln(Nemployeesit), rm
i's experience in servicing product k to country j, and a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the rm exported at least two years product k to country j before time
t, experienceikjt. Column 4 shows matching dierence-in-dierence estimation
where results are reported using the Nearest Neighbourg (NN) estimator with
caliper (0.04). Column 5 shows two-stage Heckman estimation where  is the
inverse Mill's ratio retrieved from the rst step. The rst-step is a regression of the
participation status on a vector of observable rm characteristics (see Appendix
9). Column 6 shows two stage BDM estimation where residuals from the rst
step are retrieved and averaged for (i) the pre-treatment period, (ii) the treatment
period. Step 1, individual performance for both treated and untreated individuals
is regressed on all observables except the treatment (see Appendix 10).
18Table 4: Baseline Results, Average Eect of the PIP on Assisted Firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di Di Di Di in Di Two stage BDM
in in in with Heckman Correction
Di Di Di Matching
treatmentikjt 0.354 0.216 0.112 -0.013 0.238 0.111
(0.235) (0.288) (0.322) (0.418) (0.362) (0.293)
ln salesit 1.062*** 1.125*** 1.246*** 1.263***
(0.212) (0.262) (0.243) (0.246)
ln Nemployeeit -0.099 0.017 0.009
(0.155) (0.152) (0.148)
experienceikjt 0.183* -0.047 0.018 -0.143 -0.145
(0.104) (0.168) (0.172) (0.169) (0.169)
 -0.153
(0.153)
constant 7.94*** -14.59*** -15.94*** -18.98*** -19.39*** -0.073
(0.225) (4.552) (5.422) (5.128) (5.246) (0.166)
Observations 1,862 1,193 1,071 698 698 176
R-squared 0.132 0.179 0.188 0.207 0.207 0.007
Number of id 1,134 657 577 369 369 155
Robust standard errors clustered at rm level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
4.2 Robustness
In this section we present estimation results of the eect of the PIP on assited
rms, for two alternative export performance indicators.
Table 5 reports DID estimates when considering rm i export of product k to
the EU-15 in year t, as the export performance indicator. Balancing tests results
are provided in Appendix 7. There is no problem of unbalanced covariates in our
model. All regressions are run at the i;k;t level. The coecients on the treatment
variable are not signicant for any of the specications in Table 5. Results for the
rst step of the Heckman and BDM procedures are reported in Appendix 9 and
1910.
Finally, Table 6 reports results from regressions run at the level of the rm
instead of the rm  product  destination combination. Estimation at the rm
level may drastically reduces sample size and means mixing up exports that are
covered by the program with exports that are not (namely, products other than
FFV). However, it is advisable, since the decision to participate and some of the
covariates are at the rm level. The export performance indicator is the export
value of FFV to the EU-15 exported by rm i in year t. All regressions are run at
the i;t level. The coecient on the treatment variable is signicant at the 5% level
only in column (1). Results for the rst step of the Heckman and BDM procedures
are reported in Appendix 9 and 10.
All in all, results suggest that while there seem to be an eect of the program
when considering total FFV exports to the EU, the eect disappears when looking
at a more disaggregated level (Table 4 and 5). These results are in line with
ndings in the program evaluation report.
In Table 5, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the export value
of product k from rm i to the EU-15 at time t. All regressions control for rm x
product and time xed eects.
20Table 5: Robustness I, Average Eect of the PIP on Assisted Firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di Di Di Di in Di Two stage BDM
in in in with Heckman Correction
Di Di Di Matching
treatmentikt 0.100 -0.023 -0.115 -0.114 -0.669 -0.410
(0.215) (0.264) (0.305) (0.327) (0.813) (0.564)
ln salesit 0.909*** 0.923*** 0.948*** 0.890***
(0.217) (0.287) (0.293) (0.290)
ln Nemployeeit 0.063 0.074 0.078
(0.105) (0.107) (0.103)
experienceikjt 0.299 -0.252 -0.228 -0.253 -0.213
(0.248) (0.373) (0.473) (0.504) (0.485)
 0.333
(0.357)
constant 8.95*** -9.36 -10.01 -18.98*** -8.54 0.17
(1.008) (5.834) (5.975) (5.128) (6.054) (0.311)
Observations 681 368 288 281 286 93
R-squared 0.153 0.211 0.227 0.218 0.230 0.036
Number of id 373 189 142 139 140 78
Robust standard errors clustered at rm level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
21Table 6: Robustness II, Average Eect of the PIP on Assisted Firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di Di Di Di in Di Two stage BDM
in in in with Heckman Correction
Di Di Di Matching
treatmentit 0.533** 0.381 0.666 0.666 0.711 0.477
(0.239) (0.128) (0.421) (0.426) (2.898) (0.292)
ln salesit 0.529 0.496 0.520 0.518
(0.372) (0.532) (0.538) (0.626)
ln Nemployeeit -0.181 -0.188 -0.187
(0.262) (0.266) (0.265)
experienceit -0.007 -0.007 -0.218 -0.237 -0.236
(0.233) (0.233) (0.460) (0.468) (0.530)
 -0.026
(1.570)
constant 10.07*** 0.855 2.193 1.992 2.017 -0.278
(0.704) (7.943) (11.724) (11.795) (12.850) (0.214)
Observations 199 119 85 79 79 16
R-squared 0.301 0.380 0.354 0.362 0.362 0.308
Number of id 69 38 26 21 21 9
Robust standard errors clustered at rm level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
5 Concluding Remarks
By and large, we nd no signicant impact of the PIP on Senegal's FFV export

ows when taking similar, untreated export 
ows as the counterfactual. There are
two ways of interpreting such a no-impact result.
The naive interpretation is that the PIP simply fails to achieve its objective.
That may well be true, but our failure to reject the null of no impact is not su-
cient to reach that conclusion. First, as we brie
y discussed in the introduction,
the choice of Senegal as a testing ground was driven by data availability (Senegal
22was the only country for which we had data for the pre-treatment period). It
has no claim to be a representative or random sample. Dierent conclusions may
be reached from other samples, and clearly a full, cross-country impact evalua-
tion should be undertaken. Second and more importantly, it is possible that the
PIP aected not only the treated export 
ows, but also untreated ones, through
spillovers. Participating rms are the largest and more ecient of Senegal's FFV
sector. On one hand. this means that they are more susceptible than others to
benet from the program. Thus, what we obtain is an estimate of the average
eect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), which may over-state the program's
potential eect on the whole population of producers. On the other hand, it may
also mean that smaller rms, although left out of the program, can benet from
it through imitation of best practices and even unobserved assistance from larger
rms. The argument is even more potent for untreated products: when a rm gets
PIP assistance for its FFV activities, it is quite possible (indeed, likely) that its
other activities benet as well from improved managerial practices; or destination
countries: export 
ows to non-EU destinations may benet from the program for
the same reason. In the presence of such unmeasured spillovers, the PIP's im-
pact would be underestimated by impact-evaluation methods. This is important
to keep in mind, as public assistance (whether from local governments or donors)
should be justied by market failures, like spillovers, rather than a positive rate
of return to beneciaries (which would simply create a market demand for assis-
tance services without justifying use of public funds). Thus, impact evaluation of
technical-assistance programs like the PIP is a double-edged sword and must be
interpreted with caution.
The second conclusion that should be avoided is that, either because the data
are not suciently reliable or comprehensive or because of the caveats just dis-
cussed, rigorous impact evaluation should not be undertaken. The lack of rigorous
impact evaluation undermines the credibility of claims about the program's ben-
ets made on the basis of case studies, because it is impossible to know whether
they are representative or not. Indeed, this is the message conveyed by the 2006
assessment of the impact of EU TRA (te Velde et al. 2006). Worse, in a context
where taxpayers are asking for acccountability and results in development aid, Paul
Milgrom's `unraveling principle' applies: Rational taxpayers are likely to take all
the news that is not told to be detrimental. In other words, the bad news that
impact evaluation can possibly generate (as in the present case) is probably fully
anticipated. The more the development community can provide rigorous evidence
that at least some programs do make a dierence; or that some components do;
or that, when not, failure is part of useful experimentation and action is being
taken to remedy the observed ineectiveness, the more support there will be for
development aid.
23However, as the present study highlights, it is dicult to `improvise' impact
evaluation ex-post when a program was not designed to be evaluated. Far bet-
ter would be to think seriously about evaluation ex-ante, so that TRA programs
generate experimental settings out of which useful lessons could be drawn. We
hope that this study will help convince the European Commission and other de-
velopment agencies of the need to plan for impact evaluation at program-design
time. By this, we mean to (i) clarify what measurable performance indicator the
program seeks to improve; (ii) collect, before, during and after the program pe-
riod, the data needed to track this indicator for treated and non-treated rms and
products, as well as its non-program determinants; (iii) amend the design of the
program (in particular the assignment rule) to ensure the existence of a proper
control group against which to benchmark its impact.
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276 Appendix
Table 7: Balancing Test Results for Table 5
The table reports, for each covariate included in the probit model determining selection into treatment,
the percentage bias after matching, the reduction in the bias, and the t-test statistics for the dierence
in means between treated and control groups after matching. Variables included in the propensity score
specication are: initial natural logarithm of rm i turnover (salesit0), initial natural logarithm of
number of employees in rm i (NEmployeesit0), initial number of products exported by rm i to
destination to the EU (NProdeu
it0), initial number of countries j served with product k (NDestikt0),
initial natural logarithm of total export value of product k from rm i to the EU(total exporteu
ikt0). *, **,
and *** denote statistical signicance of the t statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Sample Mean Mean % % t-test
treated control bias between reduction Mean(treated)
"
ows" "
ows" treated bias =Mean(control)
and controls t p > t
ln(salesit0) Unmatched 21.44 20.34 74.3 5.83 0
Matched 21.46 21.53 -5 93.2 -0.5 0.618
ln(Nemployeesit0) Unmatched 4.87 3.68 69.2 5.73 0
Matched 4.83 4.93 -6 91.3 -0.43 0.666
Nprodeu
it0 Unmatched 6.58 4.26 103.8 8.21 0
Matched 6.56 6.51 2.1 98 0.2 0.845
Ndestikt0 Unmatched 2.02 1.35 78 6.79 0
Matched 1.97 1.95 2.2 97.2 0.14 0.892
ln(total exporteu
ikt0) Unmatched 11.12 9.74 58.2 4.81 0
Matched 11 10.80 8.7 85.1 0.6 0.548
28Table 8: Balancing Tests Results for Table 6
The table reports, for each covariate included in the probit model determining selection into treatment,
the percentage bias after matching, the reduction in the bias, and the t-test statistics for the dierence
in means between treated and control groups after matching. Variables included in the propensity score
specication are: initial natural logarithm of rm i turnover (salesit0), initial natural logarithm of
number of employees in rm i (NEmployeesit0), initial number of FFV products exported by rm
i to the EU (NProd
ffv
ieut0), initial number of countries served with FFV product (NDest
ffv
ikt0), initial
natural logarithm of total export value of FFV product from rm i to the EU (total export
ffv
ieut0). *, **,
and *** denote statistical signicance of the t statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Sample Mean Mean % % t-test
treated control bias between reduction Mean(treated)
"
ows" "
ows" treated bias =Mean(control)
and controls t p > t
ln(salesit0) Unmatched 21.49 20.02 91.9 3.96 0
Matched 21.49 21.55 -3.6 96.1 -0.17 0.869
ln(Nemployeesit0) Unmatched 4.75 3.28 86.6 3.82 0
Matched 4.75 4.45 17.9 79.4 0.68 0.5
Nprod
ffv
it0 Unmatched 5 3.1957 83.9 3.7 0
Matched 5 5 0 100 0 1
Ndest
ffv
it0 Unmatched 5 3.1957 83.9 3.7 0
Matched 5 5 0 100 0 1
ln(total export
ffv
ieut0) Unmatched 12.88 11.67 69.6 2.98 0.004
Matched 12.88 12.73 8.9 87.2 0.37 0.711
29Table 9: First Stage Estimation: Probability of Selection into the Treatement
In column (1) the dependent variable is the probability of treatement: for a rm i product k and destina-
tion j (treatementikjt). In column (2) the dependent variable is the probability of treatement for a rm i
product k (treatementikt). And in column (3) the dependent variable is the probability of treatement
for and for a rm i (treatementit). Control variables are detailled in Appendix 7 and 8. *, **, and ***
denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Two stage BDM estimation
(column 6): residuals from the rst step are retrieved and averaged for (i) the pre-treatment period,
(ii) the treatment period. Step 1, individual performance for both treated and untreated individuals is
regressed on all observables except the treatment (see Appendix 10).
(1) (2) (3)
treatment ikc treatment ik treatment i
1st Step Probit 1st Step Probit 1st Step Probit
ln(salesit0) 0.122** ln(salesit0) 0.157** ln(salesit0) 0.165
(0.059) (0.080) (0.142)
ln(Nemployeesit0) 0.086* ln(Nemployeesit0) 0.107 ln(Nemployeesit0) 0.109
(0.048) (0.066) (0.137)











ijt0) 0.113*** ln(total exporteu




Constant -5.076*** Constant -5.899*** Constant -5.339**
(1.164) (1.487) (2.613)
Observations 698 286 79
30Table 10: First Stage BDM Procedure
Step 1 of the two stage BDM estimation: individual performance for both treated and untreated in-
dividuals is regressed on all observables except the treatment. In column (1) the dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the export value of product k from rm i to country j in time t. In column
(2) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the export value of product k from rm i to the
EU in time t. In column (3) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the export value of FFV
product from rm i in time t. Control variables are detailled in Appendix 7 and 8. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Yijkt Yikt Yit
1st Step BDM 1st Step BDM 1st Step BDM
ln(salesit0) 1.122*** ln(salesit0) 0.934** ln(salesit0) 0.449
(0.389) (0.412) (0.676)
ln(Nemployeesit0) -0.098 ln(Nemployeesit0) 0.047 ln(Nemployeesit0) -0.126
(0.233) (0.181) (0.329)
experienceikjt 0.030 experienceikt -0.259 experienceit -0.110
(0.237) (0.584) (0.613)
Constant -15.86* Constant -9.495 2.888
(8.052) (8.281) (15.049)
Observations 1,071 288 85
R-squared 0.921 0.920 0.913
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1
:
E
x
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
w
i
t
h
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
o
f
f
o
o
d
s
a
f
e
t
y
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
f
o
r
8
0
%
o
f
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
o
f
F
F
V
t
o
t
h
e
E
U
b
y
t
h
e
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
.
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
R
1
:
I
s
t
h
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
*
*
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
i
n
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
n
e
e
d
e
d
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
b
o
t
h
i
m
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
.
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
i
n
A
C
P
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
e
d
i
n
t
i
m
e
o
f
d
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
w
i
t
h
a
f
o
c
u
s
o
n
M
R
L
a
n
d
I
m
p
o
r
t
T
o
l
e
r
a
n
c
e
s
(
I
T
)
.
T
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
,
t
h
e
y
c
a
n
a
d
a
p
t
t
h
e
i
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
a
t
i
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
.
C
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
G
o
o
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
S
3
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
i
m
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
c
o
n
f
o
r
m
i
t
y
o
f
A
C
P
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
.
32